Pakistan: Consequence of Misplaced Assumptions

     When General Ayub decided to join West's war against Rise of Communism in the 50s, it was based on the assumption that it will brings with it an allied guarantee of strategic security for Pakistan. The Pacts did hail with them a huge influx of infrastructure development aid as well as scores of high-tech military equipment. Pakistan even allowed a US military base to operate from Badaber (Peshawar), which hosted the notorious U2 High Altitude Reconnaissance planes to carry out missions against USSR. (the only U2 ever shot down by USSR took off from Peshawar!!)

    Ayub's assumption was that since Pakistan was a strategic ally of United States of America and a frontline state in war against the Iron Curtain, it not only ensures our security, but also that the US will side with Pakistan in case of a military confrontation with India. After all the US loaded Pakistan with military hardware that was only supplied to its closest allies. Emboldened by US's (assumed) support, Ayub decided to launch Operation Gibraltar in Kashmir. This was the first in the series of Misplaced Assumptions on part of Pakistan. 

    Ayub thought that situation in Kashmir was ripe to instigate a rebellion by Kashmiris who will then rise against Indian Administration on sensing outright military support from Pakistan. That did not happen. Conflicted views are offered on whether the Kashmiris rather informed Indian authorities about presence of Pakistani infiltrators which led to Indian Army successfully hunting them down. In short, the assumption was flawed and ultimately became the precursor to 1965 Pakistan-India War. 

    Another assumption that went totally out of the window was that Pakistan is one of US's closest allies and therefore they will standby Pakistan in this war, and supply us with diplomatic and material support. The US on the other hand not only refused to support Pakistan diplomatically but rather imposed sanctions, cutting off military supplies altogether. US's reasoning was that military support to Pakistan was not for any other aggressive manoeuvring but only to be used against the Soviets. Arguably 1965 war turned out to be the greatest strategic blunder in Pakistan's history. It was a war of choice that later turned into that of compulsion and the nation was pushed into a conflict that it did not need. As the outcome of this war a thriving and flourishing Pakistan took a downward trajectory and never truly recovered from it. 

    Let us move on to Misplaced Assumption No 2. Come 1971, East Pakistan. I am not going to dwell into events leading up to 26 March 1971; Operation Searchlight. Assumption by the military leadership cozying in West Pakistan was that a province scale military crackdown against East Pakistani political leadership and Mukti Bahini will put an end to insurgency for good. The assumption totally lacked understanding of the political mood in East Pakistan and ended in a total catastrophe and literally the worst tragedy Pakistan had to endure that resulted in creation of Bangladesh. Surely India had a pivotal role to play in our misfortunes but it was us which provided reasons for them to capitalise upon. 

    Misplaced Assumption No 3. This time its Zia and his assumption that siding with the US (once again) in their war against USSR in Afghanistan will ensure  unrelenting support, consolidating his regime and also providing the wherewithal to translate his imaginary Islamic Republic and subsequent plans to liberate Kashmir, while piggyback riding American support. Well that assumption came falling out of the sky in a C130 with only a denture left to identify who is who and what is what! Ironically one of the reasons for this abrupt ending was Zia's another misplaced assumption that he did not need US's support to shift the war effort to Kashmir! The US thought otherwise. 

    It is however, safe to say that Zia's assumptions about War in Afghanistan rather landed Pakistan into a quagmire that haunts us to date. It brought in a disease that plagues Pakistani society to no ends. Every single societal problem that Pakistan faces today can find its lineage to Zia's decade of radical personal ideas and search for glory. 

    Our story of Misplaced Assumptions with dire consequences does not end here. In the 90s, our 'Einsteinonian' policy makers came up with another assumption and this time it was Kashmir again. Assuming that the only way to keep Kashmir cause alive in the international community was to 'set it on fire' and hence began the transfer of 'strategic assets' to the east. What our thinkers failed to factor in was India's rising clout both diplomatically and economically, especially their media outreach. Our actions actually paved way for them advocate us a state using terrorism as instrument of policy. A stigma that was further pronounced with our failure to reign in our own proxies which literally went rogue and started operating independently. This stigma is yet another outcome of our policy makers' misplaced assumptions that we could deal in proxies without having means and measures to truly control them. 

    After Pakistan went nuclear in 1999, opened another can of worm of ideas for our policy makers. A misplaced confidence that gave way to another wave of misplaced assumptions. A few sitting in power thought with overt nuclearisation on our side, it was time to settle Kashmir conflict once and for all. They however, forgot that the world does not have any experience of two nuclear states going to war, and they surely did not want to find out the result of it as well. The idea, which was a product of 'echo-chamber' of just four people, was to camouflage own force as India's homegrown militancy and sever a strategic line of communication. When done, India will immediately capitulate and accept our demands to hold plebiscite in Kashmir, since war will not be an option for them, given our freshly acquired nuclear status. Oh! how this misplaced assumption proved to be wrong. India not only massively retaliated but retaliated smartly, kept the conflict limited to the region, using their immense media outreach and global diplomatic clout closed all options for us, leading us to accept a unilateral surrender. I am not even going to talk about the costly losses of lives here or the global embarrassment suffered by us. 

    Consequent to this adventure, Pakistan become to be known as an irresponsible state which was willing to push the world into a nuclear war to settle territorial disputes. The world has always been wary of our strategic capabilities and this gave them a larger opportunity to propagate our indifference to global security. Another stigma to be carried since then. 

    I know this blog is getting way too long, but our blunders are so many that even condensed, it takes space, after all we are at it since inception, one after the other. Going on! Post 9/11, it was not a matter of choice, but compulsion for Pakistan to join US's War on Terror. Afghanistan and consequently Taliban once again became the centre of world's attention. Although, our understanding that with any amount of effort or time, NATO forces (primarily US) will eventually lose this war, but this was accompanied by a false assumption that we must continue to support Taliban in one way or the other because when the Americans leave, we will have to deal with them. Pakistan's biggest concern while US was in Afghanistan has been them seeking a larger role for India in the Afghanistan, thus triggering a protective response. Our misplaced assumption was that when Tablians will finally rule Afghanistan, India's role will diminish and they would rather help us in dealing with our internal security woes emanating from our western borders. It is ironic that despite dealing with Talibans for decades, we could not really understand the way they thought or operated. US's withdrawal actually brought more problems for Pakistan. Unable to reign in TTP, Tablians rather started dictating their own terms to Pakistan. Our influence over Kabul receded and we have somehow landed ourselves in a situation where the Americans blame us for their defeat in Afghanistan and Talibans appear to be uneasy with our 'assumed' influence and assertions. TTA Government is acting like a mercenary (that they truly are) that is eager to score some cash to run Afghanistan, leaving us in a lurch because we hardly have any money to run our own country, let alone offer it to them. I will leave it here for readers to please explore the newly organised economic group I2U2 and imagine how it is going to matter to us in Afghanistan and Middle East. 

    The worst out come of this whole deal is that we have been able to antagonise China in the process. Chinese have realised that we may not have that ingress in Kabul as we would like to claim, and therefore have rather taken it upon themselves to deal with Taliban Government directly. Pakistan has lost that role as well. 

    So adding to our list of unending misplaced assumption is our 'higher than mountains, deeper than oceans' friendship with China. We fail to account that International Relations and politics both work on basis of real politik, neither emotions nor wishes. For as long as Pakistan will be of strategic value to China, they would support us and when otherwise, ditch us. We have actually seen examples of this when it comes to support for Kashmir or even in FATF (China was holding presidential position in FATF when we were grey listed). It appears China has had enough of our domestic shenanigans. A nation that exercises strategic patience to its finest, they are stupefied at our immature impatience, policy inconsistencies and glorious stupidities which clearly are detrimental to their long term interests. The argument is based on observation that CPEC is stalled, and all it has added for Pakistan is debt. China seems to have circumnavigated us through CARs and now more interested in Iran and Middle East than Pakistan. They have brokered a monumental deal between Iran and KSA, ending decades of hostilities, confirming sure footed presence in the Khaleej. Their pledged investments in Iran on the tunes of USD 400 Bn in next 25 years should tell us something about their area of focus. Chahbahar port is now back in the game, appearing to be China's preferred exit into Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf, whereas Gawadar stands where it stood almost 5 years back with hardly any progress. All this because Chinese have shifted their efforts towards a country that offers consistency in their policies.

    Sadly, Pakistan is once again creating a new set of problems, this time mostly domestic with the military leading the charge based on yet another 'misplaced assumption. The country is in a precarious economic state with political division tugging at the seams and the overall effect compounded by the dwindling security situation, mainly originating from the western frontier. This time, the generals have decided to dismantle yet another immensely popular political party, Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf with efforts to keep Ex Prime Minister Imran Khan from participating in upcoming elections. This has lead to a country wide crackdown on the political workers and party members of th said party, with laws of Pakistan, shamelessly violated by state institutions on behest of the powerful generals calling the shot. Need it be reminded that such tactics when practiced in the past, have had serious consequences for the country. The unfolding of political story of Imran Khan will live to tell the story is not so distant future, and it seems that Pakistan is once again on the path to commit another strategic blunder, based on flawed assumptions.    

The question that however, needs to be answered is why Pakistan falls victim to these blunders, one after the other. Hardly a single strategic decision taken by Pakistani policy makers has landed us the advantage we assumed form it. The answer to this is fairly simple; lack of institutional processes. In Pakistan, individuals have always occupied a larger status than institutions. Thats one reason that institutions could never become a coherent part of the strategic system of the country. Critical decisions are almost always based on individuals' personal whims and wishes or at best from an extremely narrow band of input. This is part deliberate and part due to nation's obsession with larger than life 'heroes'. Deliberate because any institutional approach leaves little space for 'small men in big offices' to exercise authority. 

    Another major issue is the 'ingredient' of our strategic setup which is occupied by the few, ill-organised and not equipped to deal with vastness and complxities of issues we face. Compounding it is the fact that those few are impossible to veto. This culture has also given way to complacency on part of various state institutions which although capable of providing invaluable input on critical issues, but seem not to be bothered given that their ideas are often relegated to nothing but the few. 

“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”

George Santayana

     This particular quote is so very often repeated in higher ups but only a sound bite. Unless we set our course straight, inculcate an institutions based Strategic Culture we may continue to repeat these blunders all based on misplaced assumptions for a foreseeable future.